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WINDS OF CHANGE 1989
A PERSPECTIVE FROM AN OFFICE FOR RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS SOMEWHERE IN
EASTERN EUROPE

By Vjekoslav Perica

Vjekoslav Perica is a Croatian-American historian, author of, among others, Balkan Idols: Religion
and Nationalism in Yugoslav States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) and Pax
Americana in the Adriatic and the Balkans: History, Memory and Cultural Representations of U.S.
Peacemaking, 1919-2014 (in Croatian), (Zagreb: Algoritam, 2015). He currently works on a book
and humanitarian-peacemaking project tentatively titled, “Balkanization and Reconciliation.”
Perica holds a Ph.D. in history from the University of Minnesota Twin Cities, USA. In the 1970s
in former Yugoslavia, he was a basketball player; in the 1980s he was a jurist and journalist until
coming to America in 1991. As a US academic, he has been a Fulbright scholar in Belgrade, Serbia,
and in 2012 he held a research fellowship at Netherlands Institute for Advanced Studies in the
Humanities and Social Sciences (NIAS). Since 2006, Perica has been a Professor of History at the
University of Rijeka, Croatia from which he is retiring this year. Perica lives in Baltimore,
Maryland and on the Dalmatian isle of Šolta, Croatia. In between, most enthusiastically, he spends
time with grandsons and their pets in New York City.

Under communism, in what used to be Eastern Europe, religion was neither outlawed nor
favorably regarded either. In some cases, church and state had been at latent or open war as in
Poland or in the former Yugoslavia. There, church-state relations radically changed over the course
of more than five decades, which is the theme of this article. Confrontations began in 1945 and
spanned to 1953. Accommodations from 1966 to 1980 permitted a relatively peaceful coexistence
between church and state. Thereafter the public religions and ethnic mobilizations of the 1980s
escalated into the Balkan wars of the 1990s. It was during this era when the major faiths merged
with the ethnic warring factions. As the Cold War ended, and communist regimes collapsed across
East Central Europe, Yugoslav post-Titoist elites in the two westernmost Yugoslav republics
presented reform-minded positions and images. Revising restrictive policies toward religion
seemed appropriate for a start. Slovenia, soon followed by Croatia, symbolically promoted
Christmas greetings and programs on state TV. In Croatia, regional and local offices for religious
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affairs were urged from higher state and party authorities to make religious organizations the ailing
regime’s friends.
Religious communities generally welcomed the new policies, yet their responses varied
depending on whether they were majority or minority groups. Religious minorities would show
support for the reforms to abolish official atheism, expand religious liberty, and democratize the
country whose unity they did not question. By contrast, the majority religions, notably Serbian
Orthodoxy and Croat Catholicism--and after 1989, also Bosnian Islam--preferred balkanization of
the multiethnic federation to be replaced by homogenous ethno-confessional nation-states with
religious monopolies.
These notes outline some aspects of the landmark change according to the records from the
City Council’s Office for Religious Affairs in Split, Dalmatia, Croatia’s largest coastal city. The
picture is polished by reminiscences of the office’s administrator, who happens to be a firsthand
witness and survivor of the Great Transformation–namely this article’s author.
In 1989, the tiny local church community of the Seventh-day Adventists appointed a new
pastor. He visited the city office for religious affairs to introduce himself and inquire about
renovation of their house for worship. The meeting was held in a spacious mayor’s office over
sandwiches and refreshments, which was not customary prior to the relaxation. The new location
and logistics were to showcase the similarly new liberal policy, outlined in the fresh set of
instructions from above. The communists must free themselves from “sectarian mentality,” a
Croatian Communist party document pointed out in order to argue that the party now needs to
embrace everyone, including religious believers willing to support the key values of the
multiethnic federalism, socialist self-managed economy, and nonaligned foreign policy.
The state and the party granted a generous funding for the logistical support to meetings
with religious authorities. Hence, the mayor made available her salon, notably adorned with
portrait of the city’s leaders from Emperor Diocletian to the last communist, and staff portraits for
the purpose of banquets and receptions. However, the treatment of the major churches and
religious minorities differed considerably. Thus, if the visitors to the office for religious affairs
were the Catholic Archbishop metropolitan or Serbian Orthodox bishop, the mayor would make
sure to greet religious leaders personally as waiters in formal attire serve Dalmatian scampi risotto,
Italian prosciutto, and fine wines. For an Adventist pastor, however, the sandwiches would do.
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Nonetheless, the chairman and the administrator greeted the young pastor with cordial
smiles and kind words. Moreover, the sandwiches were made vegetarian and beverages nonalcoholic to show respect for this religion’s nutritional habits. The young cleric was originally
from the Vojvodina, Yugoslavia’s remarkable ethnically and religiously diverse province,
although the wars of the 1990s remarkably enhanced the Serb relative majority, while local
societies still remained pluralistic. In the Vojvodina autonomous province, besides the two major
Christian Churches encompassing the two largest nationalities, the Serbs and the Croats, there
were also some 40 plus smaller, mainly Christian, groups, with the membership of several dozen
ethnic minorities. The pastor spoke in the Serbo-Croatian ekavian urban dialect of Novi Sad and
Belgrade where he went to school and served before. An active and outgoing personality, he
revealed that his congregation held weekly worship services in a private apartment on the 10th floor
of a suburban socialist-era skyscraper. The flock did not proselytize in the neighborhood, however,
former pastors explained. Instead, he initiated cordial greetings in the halls and elevators, in the
streets and plazas, and small everyday talks aimed at showing that the church members were
friendly neighbors prepared to help everyone. The Church owned a house of worship at a
prestigious city center location next to large park. Yet, the building, damaged during the
construction of the city’s underground railway, was not functional and needed a thorough
reconstruction. City authorities covered the damage, and the Church secured additional funding
from its own resources. The construction could begin, but stalled for many years. The problem
was not the regime’s ideological bias but bureaucratic hairsplitting, combined with difficulties
caused by the failing socialist urban development. It was not about ideological obstruction in late
socialism, as the antireligious aspect of the ideology had lost most of its revolutionary zeal.
The pastor took a bite of a vegetarian sandwich listening to the chairman of the Committee
for religious affairs elaborating the new policy: “Dear Sir, our party is changing course,” comrade
chairman explained: “From now on, you get not just vegetarian sandwiches but also free legal
assistance and most importantly, license for rebuilding the church! I mean--promptly, say, how
about next week; you just stop by and pick up all the documents.…” The Seventh-day Adventist
was stunned. He looked in disbelief, paused with his vegetarian sandwich and almost spilled a
glass of lemonade on a Persian rug made in Bosnia.
The local congregation of Seventh-Day Adventists would soon begin the renovation and
enlargement of their house of worship. The project paused during the war in Croatia and Bosnia-
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Herzegovina 1991-1995. The new, enlarged and modernized church finally opened in 1998. The
local newspaper, controlled by the ruling nationalistic Croat-Catholic party, acknowledged the
Adventists’ humanitarian work with refugees during the war. Moreover, the paper bragged that the
new democratic government, celebrating religious liberty previously suppressed by godless
communists, had issued nearly a hundred licenses for new church construction in the city
metropolitan area. This was not quite true. The city archives and records show that from 1988 to
1991 alone, the office for religious affairs issued 75 licenses for new churches and a mosque. What
actually changed when the nationalists took power in 1990, was that the new administration
allowed Catholic parishes and monasteries to increase ambitions and skip rules and boundaries.
This resulted in several dozen landmarks of the new era: ugly, triumphalist, and boastful sacral
architecture. The new construction devastated parks and recreation areas, penetrated pedestrian
zones on ancient plazas, and in suburbia it competed with corporate warehouses and shopping
malls as conspicuous landmarks of the new landscape.
In the landmark year of 1989, the office for religious affairs in the city of Split also recorded
a historic meeting with Jehovah Witnesses. Historic it was, regarding the fact that nobody ever
invited them for a visit and talk before, let alone the sandwiches and refreshments. Most
importantly, friendly meetings were followed by quick authorization of new church construction.
Three Jehovah’s Witnesses leaders dressed in dark blue and grey suits visited the office for
religious affairs. Their visit succeeded the office’s invitation for a meeting, promising to address
the group’s long-standing request for their Hall for meetings and worship. The office would have
previously never invited them except for issuing of warnings and reprimands about conscientious
objectors’ conflict with the Yugoslav Army and for knocking on concerned citizens’ doors. Two
of the three church leaders were from the local congregation and the third arrived form the capital
Belgrade. It was made known to us by the office by the local state security police department, that
they all did time in prison between 5-15 years for refusing to carry weapons during military service.
Jehovah’s Witnesses politely declined the sandwiches accepting only water and lemonade.
The talk about the request for a larger Meeting Hall was brief. Then the office’s administrator
guided the guests to the adjacent Department for Urban Planning where a building license awaited
them along with friendly experts and counselors who could help with the details. Jehovah’s
Witnesses, although used to witnessing unexpected scenarios when knocking uninvited on
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people’s doors to deliver The Watchtower journal, this time looked surprised and confused, if not
shocked.
A week later, two of the three Jehovah Witnesses who previously visited the Office for
Religious Affairs knocked on the committee administrator’s doors without appointment. They
brought a gift, a nicely gift-wrapped bottle of scotch whiskey. The brand was rather cheap,
however; probably because of Jehovah’s Witnesses’ ignorance about good whiskeys rather than
frugality. Back then, under mature Titoism, Yugoslav socialist middle class preferred a rather
expensive imported Chivas 12 years old scotch whiskey, famously enjoyed by Tito himself. Yet,
practicing religious believers in communist Yugoslavia were unlikely to express interest in the
atheistic dictator’s drinking habits. Jehovah Witnesses, holding the gift, sat solemnly, telling their
previous bitter experiences with this office, speaking on the verge of tears. They wished to express
gratitude, they said, for the kindness and understanding unseen before by the members of their
community in interaction with this government. The administrator politely declined to accept the
gift. He advised, with tongue-in check, that it could better serve purpose later in the process to
make happier and more efficient the late socialist-era construction inspectors.
Paradoxically, Yugoslav communist authorities harassed the non-threatening religious
opposition while appeasing the regime’s avowed clerical-nationalist enemies. Religious minorities
were mistreated solely because of their religiosity. Their congregations were multiethnic and
apolitical. Their members were often from mixed marriages and multiethnic families naturally
supportive of Yugoslav unity and federalism, but abhorrent to the major ethnic nationalisms such
as Great Serbian and Croat separatist. Serbian and Croatian churches, and by the late 1980s, also
the third largest religion, the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had all fused
religious and national identity while seeking the balkanization of Yugoslavia. By contrast,
religious minorities, although opposing communist party monopoly and official atheism, preferred
a united multiethnic Yugoslavia.
The Titoist regime repression of Jehovah Witnesses and the Nazarenes as conscientious
objectors exemplifies methods that not even the worst clerical nationalists had suffered.
Conscientious objectors challenged the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army–the most rigid segment of the
regime. This persecution against religious minorities did not ease during the liberalized socialism
of the seventies and eighties. At the same time, the Serbian Orthodox Church and Croatian national
Catholicism became locomotives of ethnic nationalist movements. After Tito’s death, it became
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clear that the ethno-confessional blocks sought to dismantle the Yugoslav federation and replace
it with ethnic nation-states. The project would involve the partitioning of Bosnia-Herzegovina and
therefore, a major war. The regime, however, harassed religious minorities and only sporadically
applied repression against the major churches while negotiating and seeking some kind of a deal
with the two clerical elites.
Unlike the grateful representatives of the Seventh-day Adventists and Jehovah’s Witnesses
responding to the policy changes of 1989, the majority clerical elites smelled power; and that in
1989 became quite visible. They turned arrogant and demanding. While visiting this office for
religious affairs in the late 1980s, the Croat Catholic Archbishop and the Serb Bishop posed not
just as negotiators with leverage but also as superior political rivals. This duo openly showed scorn
for government officials, looking down on them and asking to negotiate with the top state and
federal authorities. The Catholic Archbishop, for example, criticized the government for not
responding appropriately to a then-galloping Serbian nationalism. yet stopped short of promising
the Church’s support for at least moderate nationalists in the first multiparty elections although a
coalition of the left and nationalist moderates, if victorious, could have averted the war. Speaking
of which, both major churches had considered the partition and war options as early as 1987; the
Serbian Orthodox Church expressed it openly. Historians would find noteworthy the following
episode: a meeting in the office for religious affairs with the Serbian Orthodox Bishop, regarding
preparations for the 600th anniversary of the Kosovo Battle in June 1989. This Bishop first ignored
the license to rebuild the local parish church presented to him by the city authorities, aimed at
countering the media campaign from Belgrade. The Bishop’s refusal to comply with Croatia’s
authorities, motivated solely by ethnic and religious hatred, was based on long-standing negligence
to provide the Serb Orthodox community in Split a place of worship. As the meeting neared
conclusion, the Serb bishop mentioned the following: “Let me tell, you, gentlemen, that our
Church has very good relations with the Yugoslav People’s Army. For celebrating the Kosovo
battle jubilee’s in Dalmatia, we have asked military authorities at Knin to lend us their large tents
for the faithful to gather in the shade around the church after the liturgy. They gladly granted our
request. You should know, gentlemen, our Church and our army are on very good terms, we are
very close friends. In case of a serious crisis I am sure that we would be on the same side,” the
bishop remarked with a cynical grin.
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At the time, the government officials were left surprised while contemplating the meaning
of the new discourse. Two years later, the Serbian minority in Croatia staged an armed rebellion
headquartered at the city of Knin. Subsequently, an all-out war in Croatia broke out with the major
battle over the city of Vukovar, on the border between Serbia and Croatia. The city was defended
by Croat separatist militia and besieged by the Yugoslav Army and Serb nationalist paramilitaries.
As Croat fighters wore crosses and were assisted by military chaplains, some Serbian church
leaders sprinkled holy water on the tanks rolling to the battle.
After the collapse of Yugoslavia and Balkan wars of the 1990s, new nation-states came to
life across the balkanized region. The criminal practices of ethnic cleansing made them ethnically
homogenous more than ever before in history. The new Serbia and Croatia were designed
according to the new model of Balkan nationalism as mutually hostile, ethnocentric states, each
with a religious monopoly or “national church.” Religious and ethnic minorities continued to be
stigmatized groups and second-class citizens sharing the sorry fate with atheists who once
persecuted them. Ironically, many of the atheists had learned how to stay in power by adopting the
new state-sponsored religiosity.
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